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  Central banks typically intervene in foreign exchange markets via large trades in 
the “over-the-counter” market by placing telephone calls with brokers to communicate 
orders. Such orders are more, or less, transparent depending upon the instructions of the 
central bank to its counterparties regarding a preference for secrecy or communication. In 
any case, it is uncommon to know the size of the central bank’s order in real time or the 
exact price at which it was executed. Market participants must infer the intervening 
central bank’s exchange rate target from exchange rate behavior on the day of a known or 
rumored intervention. 
  This study reports and analyzes a unique type of foreign exchange (FX) market 
intervention by the Russian Central Bank which occurred by placing limit orders on an 
electronic limit order book to set an upper bound on the rouble price of a dollar 
(USDRUR). This could be a credible statement of an exchange rate target zone that 
signals a firm commitment of the Bank to spend or accumulate reserves as needed to 
keep the exchange rate within the zone. We will analyze for our sample the workings of 
such an electronic latent intervention arrangement that occurred in Russia.
1
                                                 
1  Target zones have received ongoing interest in the literature, such as recently Iannizzotto and 
Taylor (1999), Bauer et al. (2007) and Corrado et al. (2007) but there is no empirical examination 
of a target zone in the presence of electronic trading. 
  1  There is a large literature on foreign exchange intervention.
2 Empirical papers 
have been limited by a lack of knowledge of the exact time of central bank activity. 
Those central banks that do make their activity public typically have only published daily 
data on the size of their intervention activity, but exact knowledge of when they were in 
the market has to be inferred from news reports or actual price movements.
3 Exceptions 
to this are the Swiss National Bank, which has made its data public. Data sets from 
Denmark and Canada have been studied, but are not available to the public.
4 An 
important aspect of the existing literature is that it, quite rightly, focuses on the effects of 
intervention in terms of the impact of central bank decisions to intervene and the 
consequent exchange rate effects of purchases or sales of currency.
5 What is unique 
about the analysis undertaken in our paper is that we study what could be called 
“automated intervention” in that the central bank determines a desired range for the 
exchange rate and then places very large limit orders to keep the exchange rate inside this 
range. 
The unusually detailed information about the complete order book allows 
studying intervention effects in an almost “ideal” microstructure setting: we analyze 
about 2,700 central bank transactions within a total sample of more than 56,000 orders, 
                                                 
2  Among the several surveys, Sarno and Taylor (2001), Edison (1993), Almekinders (1995) and 
Neely (2005) cover the key issues. 
3  Scalia (2006) is a recent example of a high-frequency study using news of intervention to 
identify event time. Fischer (2006) shows that Reuters news reports of Swiss intervention are 
often erroneous and bring into question the accuracy of such news for timing Swiss interventions. 
4  See Fatum and Pedersen (2007) for the Danish example; Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), Payne 
and Vitale (2003), and Pasquariello (2007) for Swiss data; and Beattie and Fillion (1999) and 
Fatum and King (2005) for Canada. 
5  Starting with Frankel and Dominguez (1993) more recent studies find an impact of 
intervention, including Humpage (1999) and Dominguez (2003) for the US, Ito (2002, 2007) for 
Japan, Fatum and Hutchison (2003) for Germany (and the US), Kearns and Rigobon (2005) for 
Australia and Disyatat and Galati (2007) for the Czech Republic. Also communication can be 
effective (Fratzscher, 2006) or even wrongly believed interventions (Dominguez and Panthaki, 
2007). 
  2among them about 30,000 transactions. The resulting order flow analyses are new to the 
intervention literature.
6 We find that intervention increases exchange rate volatility (and 
spread) for the next minutes but that intervention days show a lower degree of volatility 
(and spread) than non-intervention days. We also show for intraday data that the price 
impact of interbank order flow is smaller on intervention days than on non-intervention 
days. Finally, we reveal that informed banks take different positions than uninformed 
banks as they tend to trade against the central bank – which reflects a rational stance. 
Despite this position taking, the targeted exchange rate range holds and volatility, spread 
and price impact go down. Overall, the intervention band seems to realize the wanted 
effects of a target zone during the few weeks period under study. 
  The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the institutional details of 
the electronic crossing network will be presented along with a detailed overview of the 
data available for analysis. Then in Section III, an empirical examination of the limit 
orders placed by the central bank is undertaken with a focus on its effect on volatility, 
spread, price impact of order flow and order choice. Section IV discusses implications for 
the central bank and, finally, Section V offers a summary and conclusions. 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL  DETAILS 
 
II.A.  The SELT System 
                                                 
6  To our knowledge there are two other studies analyzing interventions in an order flow 
approach: Scalia (2006) has to estimate intervention timing and thus aggregates data to hourly 
frequency, Girardin and Lyons (2007) use customer order flow of a large bank on a daily 
frequency. 
  3  Local interbank trading in the rouble occurs on an electronic limit order market at 
the MICEX in Moscow and, at the time of interest to this study, March 2002, this market 
determined the official exchange rate of the USDRUR. This country-wide trading at the 
MICEX is called the “unified trading session” or UTS. The structure is that of a multiple 
dealer market without designated market makers. While an interbank market, it is 
expected that much of the trading reflects customer orders received by the participating 
banks. During the period analyzed, the UTS took place for one hour a day from 10:30-
11:30 Moscow time and the only instrument traded was the USDRUR spot rate.
7
  MICEX FX trading occurs on the SELT electronic system that is similar to the 
electronic brokerage systems of Reuters or EBS. One difference for SELT is that only 
limit orders, specifying price and quantity desired, or cancellations may be submitted. 
Unlike Reuters or EBS, there are no market orders specifying desired quantity at the best 
price in the order book. To receive immediate execution, an order must be submitted that 
crosses the best price in the order book. Such marketable or crossing limit orders are the 
equivalent of market orders on the SELT. Like EBS or Reuters, participants on SELT just 
see the top of the book or the best bid and ask prices with associated order size. 
  Foreign exchange trading within Russia appears to have a local information 
component.
8 Banks in the financial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg are more likely 
to see the customer order flow of the large Russian corporate clients than banks in other 
cities. The banks on the periphery are also less likely to be as well informed on economic 
policy developments as the banks in the financial centers. Menkhoff and Schmeling 
(2007) show that there is more likely to be a permanent price impact of trades originated 
                                                 
7  Trading was later extended to a four hour session and forward contracts. 
8  See Menkhoff and Schmeling (2007). 
  4by Moscow and St. Petersburg banks than banks on the periphery. This is consistent with 
the trades from the financial centers reflecting private information compared to the 
transitory price impact associated with the trades originated by other banks. Following 
these earlier findings, we will structure some of our empirical analysis to take account of 
this institutional feature of the Russian market. 
  Participants on the system see the best bid and offer price plus respective 
quantities. They also see the cumulative buy and sell volumes for the current trading 
session and the last transaction quantity and price. Trades occur anonymously and then 
post-trade counterparty identities are revealed. The fact that the central bank learns the 
identities of private banks that trade at its limit order may serve as a form of central bank 
monitoring that helps to enforce the desired target zone with a minimum of reserve loss. 
  It is likely that using an electronic limit order book as a vehicle for maintaining a 
target zone is effective only in a case where that crossing network accounts for a very 
significant part of the overall market. In the case of Russia, this was made possible by the 
controls on foreign exchange trading. Foreigners traded roubles in an offshore market in 
the form of non-deliverable forward contracts. So the domestic market was segmented 
from foreign participation and this allowed the central bank to effectively target the 
exchange rate with limit orders on the MICEX.
9 Such a mechanism is unlikely to be of 
much use to a country with a convertible currency and open financial markets given the 
current structure of the foreign exchange market. For instance, electronic trading in the 
major developed currencies is split across several different platforms and there is no one 
                                                 
9  We thus observe and analyze the trading dynamics of the domestic market. Within domestic 
markets, the UTS provides much higher liquidity than regional bourses which are only open to 
banks from the respective regions. Moreover, the central bank determines via its interventions the 
official exchange rate at the UTS which is then binding to others. Thus the UTS is the core 
market to exchange information among domestic players. 
  5crossing network that has a dominant portion of overall liquidity. Over time, if liquidity 
concentrates on one platform and electronic trading comes to dominate the large and 
active over-the-counter market, it may be possible to think of managing a target zone via 
an electronic limit order market for the major currencies. But for emerging market 
currencies with segmented domestic foreign exchange markets, the existence of an 
efficient electronic market that pools liquidity for domestic trading may serve as a useful 
vehicle for operating a target zone and may thus provide an alternative to more 
conventional interventions in the OTC market. 
 
II.B. Data 
  We study a unique data set on the Russian interdealer FX market for USDRUR 
over a period in March 2002 during which the central bank used the market for 
intervention purposes. There were 722 traders participating in the market at this time. 
While participants only see the best bid and ask orders in real time, we have anonymous 
data on the entire order book, or every submitted and cancelled order and trade that 
occurred on the system during this period. The data are stamped to the second and we 
know the initiator of each transaction, although true identities are unknown for us. The 
data also indicate the regional location of the bank submitting the order. 
  The data cover the period from March 1 to March 22, 2002. This includes days 
with major FX market intervention by the central bank and provides a unique view of a 
central bank using an electronic limit order book to set an exchange rate bound. Table 1 
provides descriptive statistics for each day in the sample. At the bottom of the table, 
summary statistics are given for March 1 to 7, the days of central bank intervention. On 
  6these days, the central bank’s limit price served as an upper bound on the price in the 
market. Note that these were the days of heaviest trading volume that month, with 
average trade size of $91,024 on those 5 days compared to $49,401 on the other days. 
The central bank’s ask price was the effective limit in the market and there were many 
more trades that occurred at the central bank’s ask price (2,584) than bid price (109) over 
those days. It is notable that the maximum price in the market on March 4-7 was 30.9950. 
The central bank’s ask provided an upper bound for the exchange rate and the market was 
actively consuming the liquidity offered by the central bank. 
  Figure 1 contains a histogram of the sample average number of trades and order 
activity, including submissions and cancellations, in each 5 minute interval. There is a 
clear pattern of both trades and orders being at their peak at the beginning of the session 
and then declining over the session. By the third 5-minute interval, trades and orders are 
less than half of their values for the first 5-minute interval. By mid-session, trades and 
orders appear to plateau at a level less than half of the values during the first 5-minute 
interval. It appears that liquidity peaks early in each session and then steadily tapers off 
and becomes uniformly low over the last half of each session. 
  Table 2 summarizes the order and trade activity of the central bank and the private 
banks. It is striking that the central bank only submits 11 limit orders over the sample 
period with a median size of $50,298,000 versus the private banks who submit 6,626 
orders with median size of $30,000. The central bank pegs the target zone for the rouble 
by placing large limit orders at the target zone bound and then filling all orders that arrive 
at that price. The central bank only initiates 7 trades. The rest of its trade activity is as 
counterparty to private-bank-initiated trades. The median size of the central bank trades is 
  7$210,000 while the median for the private banks is $20,000. This, coupled with the 
minimum trade size of $100,000 for the central bank and $1,000 for the private banks, 
yields a picture of a market where the private bank trades with the central bank tend to be 
large versus a relatively small size of the private interbank trades among themselves. 
 
II.C.  The Central Bank’s Intervention Threshold 
Intervention via the limit order book occurs by the central bank placing a large 
limit order at the beginning of a trading session and then meeting all orders that cross that 
price. While this could occur on both sides of the market, in the case of a bank desiring to 
establish a narrow range for the exchange rate, in the Russian case, the rouble was 
undergoing a period of depreciation as seen in Figure 2. As a result, the intervention 
policy involved setting an upper bound on the exchange rate via a large limit ask order at 
the start of each day. This allowed the central bank to control the daily rate of 
depreciation in a kind of crawling peg arrangement. 
  The effect of such an arrangement is clearly seen in a plot of the limit order price 
and counterparty activity for a day when the central bank’s limit price becomes one side 
of the inside spread in the market.  The upper part of Figure 3 illustrates the central 
bank’s limit orders and the market price for March 4-7. On March 1, the central bank set 
a narrow range for the rouble with a bid price of 30.9400 and an ask price of 30.9450, 
which rises to 30.9500 late in the session. It is seen that many trades occurred at both 
sides of the central bank’s orders. Then on March 4, the ask price limit is raised to 
30.9950 and the market consistently trades at that price over the day. The lower part of 
Figure 3 shows that the central bank started the day with an order for $50 million which 
  8is soon raised to $150 million. As the market continued to take the liquidity on offer by 
the central bank, the available quantity on offer steadily declines over the day ending 
around $75 million. Then on each successive day, the central bank posts a new order of 
$150 million at the ask price of 30.9950. On March 5, the third and few more trades 
occurs at that price so the quantity on offer by the central bank slightly decreases only. 
On March 6 and 7, there were also only a few trades with the Central Bank as 
counterparty right at the beginning of the session, but later the market seemed to trade 
consistently at the central bank’s ask price and the quantity on offer fell steadily. 
 
III. EFFECTS  OF  CENTRAL BANK LIMIT ORDERS 
 
III.A.  The Intervention Effect on Volatility and Spread 
The microstructure literature on foreign exchange interventions has not produced 
fully conclusive results about the intervention effect on exchange rate volatility. Whereas 
interventions are tentatively conducted in order to reduce volatility (see Neely, 2007), 
their success has been questioned and high frequency analyses show that interventions 
rather increase short-term volatility (Dominguez, 2006). 
  The literature on this subject is limited by appropriate data to overcome the 
identification problem: Are interventions related to volatility because they aim for 
stabilizing volatile markets or do they create volatility? At the daily data frequency the 
relation between interventions and volatility is positive, so intraday data seem helpful in 
solving the causality issue. Indeed, at high frequency there is not much doubt that 
interventions are treated as news by the market and lead to a similar reaction, i.e. a short-
  9term volatility increase.
10 At the daily level, however, there is still controversy whether 
possibly the exchange rate regime may play a role. The target zone model predicts that a 
credible commitment should reduce volatility: it seems plausible that a central bank 
fixing – in our case in particular – the ask price reduces risk to a one-sided risk which 
should lower volatility and spread. There is also evidence from the Canadian experience 
with a pre-announced non-intervention band which seemed to lead to somewhat lower 
volatility due to interventions (Beattie and Fillion, 1999). 
  We use our tick-by-tick data to construct a time series sampled at a 30 second 
frequency to eliminate microstructure noise.
11 With this data at hand we examine 
determinants of volatility, measured by the standard deviation of midquotes within a 30 
second interval.
12 The approach aims for integrating the intraday and daily view by 
considering the effect of lagged interventions, i.e. during the last few minutes, and also 
considering a dummy variable for intervention days. The equation we estimate via GMM 





ˆtj t j t t
j
σαβ share λ CBday ε 1 t + +− + +
=
=+ ⋅ +⋅ + + ∑ Θγ  (1) 
where   is the midquote return standard deviation, share ˆt σ t is the share of total trading 
volume in a 30 second time interval transacted with the central bank as counterparty, 
                                                 
10  This has been nicely demonstrated by D’Souza (2002) who compares the effect of 
interventions versus replenishment operations of the central bank on volatility: interventions 
increase volatility, non-interventions do not. 
11  Investigating data aggregated over fixed calendar time is quite common, see e.g. Evans and 
Lyons (2002, 2002a). Results are robust when sampling at a different frequency, e.g. one minute 
(see Payne (2003) for similar findings). 
12  Using the absolute return over a 30 second interval or the sum of squared returns yields 
qualitatively the same results. 
  10CBdayt is a dummy indicating days with central bank activity
13, and Θt  is a vector of 
(lagged) control variables. Depending on the specification employed, Θt includes lagged 
volatility, lagged bid-ask spreads (i.e. the mean bid-ask spread over a 30 seconds 
interval), lagged trading volume and deterministic time patterns (the time variable is just 
the minute of the trading session). Note also, that here and in all further econometric 
estimation exercises, we eliminate overnight observations. For example, in the regression 
above, the first four 30 second intervals are eliminated from the sample and show up as 
lagged values in the above regression only. Furthermore, since we are dealing with 
standard deviations which are bounded below by zero, one might also use a censored 
regression model with censoring at zero. Doing so does not alter the findings reported 
below. 
The left panel of Table 3 contains estimation results for different specifications of 
Θt and shows that both volatility effects discussed above are significant: first, volatility 
increases directly after interventions and keeps the significantly increased level for about 
one or two minutes, i.e. the βj’s are significant. Second, volatility is significantly lower 
during intervention days as indicated by the highly significant estimate for λ.
14 As 
controls in the full specification (iii) we use lagged volatility, then lagged spread and 
transaction volume to consider possible delayed effects from earlier events and finally 
two time variables to consider a possible volatility pattern during the one hour opening 
time. However, whether controls or subsets of these controls are used or not, results 
                                                 
13  Since all intervention days have trades with the central bank right at the beginning of the day 
(see e.g. Figure 2), the fact that the central bank intervenes on a given day is visible to the market 
and, thus, public information. Therefore, we use the CBday dummy in its form described above. 
However, using a dummy variable that indicates lagged intervention days, i.e. interventions at the 
day before, does not change the qualitative conclusions. 
14  These effects also hold when we test them in isolation and without any controls. 
  11remain stable. Therefore, the effect is unlikely to result from higher trading volume due 
to central bank trading since trading volume is included as a control in the regression and 
since trading volume and the share of central bank activity (share) is not significantly 
correlated on intervention days.
15
  We conclude that the Russian target zone policy during the sample period has two 
effects on volatility, which have – to the best of our knowledge – not been analyzed in a 
single approach before: automated intervention reduces volatility at the daily level and 
increases volatility in the minutes following a trade at the central bank’s ask price. 
  In another regression we analyze the effect of intervention on bid-ask spreads. 
There are hardly any papers examining this relation as appropriate data are missing. The 
studies of Chari (2007) and Pasquariello (2007) rely on quotes which are tentatively 
wider than effective spreads and do not necessarily reflect market conditions as precisely. 
Both studies find that spread increases after interventions, indicating that a volatility 
reducing effect may be counter balanced by higher transaction costs for customers (see 
Naranjo and Nimalendran, 2000, for daily data). Thus, we test this by using an equivalent 
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j
meanspread αβ share λ CBday ε 1 t + −+ +
=
=+ ⋅ +⋅ + + ∑ Θγ +
                                                
 (2) 
where (mean spread)t is the average bid-ask spread over a 30 second interval and all other 
variable definitions remain unchanged. Note, that we use only three lags of the share 
variables since further lags are generally insignificant and also increase the AIC. Again, 
 
15  As can be seen in Table 1, daily trading volume and CB activity is correlated. However, in the 
intraday analysis conducted here (intervals of 30 seconds), we do not find a high correlation of 
volume and the share variable. 
  12one might use a censored regression model. However, the results do not change when 
doing so. 
Results are shown in the right panel of Table 3 – in specifications (iv) to (vi) – 
and we find a negative significant sign at the daily level and a very short-lived spread 
increase after interventions. Obviously, spread effects go in the same direction as 
volatility effects in our sample. 
The increase in spreads directly following interventions seems to be – at least 
partly – driven by lower liquidity. We find some (unreported) evidence that limit order 
submission decreases subsequently to reaching the central bank’s quote which might 
explain the temporary surge in spreads. However, the effect on spreads is short-lived and 
is clearly outweighed by the overall reduction in spreads on central bank intervention 
days. 
  Overall, in the case studied here intervention policy seems to contribute towards 
stable markets without noteworthy costs for the public. 
 
III.B.  The Target Zone Effect on the Price Impact of Order Flow 
We extend the analysis of an automated target zone effect on trading activity by 
considering high frequency order flow. The theoretical expectation of the price effects of 
order flow is derived from the target zone literature. Following Krugman (1991), a 
credible exchange rate band should dampen the price effect of order flow as the limit of 
the band is approached. Taking into account that order flow transports information 
(Lyons, 2001), days when the central bank’s limit is reached should be characterized by a 
lower price impact of order flow, i.e. that the exchange rate is less responsive to the 
  13arrival of information. Girardin and Lyons (2007) do not find clear evidence for such an 
effect for daily end user order flow of Citibank in the Yen/US dollar market. 
  We run price impact regressions of order flow on returns, as in Evans and Lyons 
(2002), i.e. we estimate via GMM a regression of the following form, again on the basis 
of 30 second intervals: 
  101 12 1 13 1 1 1 Δ t t tt tt t t m 1 t β β OF β OF CBday β OF CBday Dist γΘ ε + + ++ ++ + =+ + + + + +  (3) 
where Δmt+1 is the midquote return over the chosen interval, OFt+1 is the order flow 
indicator
16 and CBday is a dummy that equals one on intervention days.
17 Dist denotes 
the average distance to the upper limit of the Central Bank's target zone, and, again, Θt  
contains control variables, namely lagged midquote returns and order flows. 
For this specification we again rely on the 30 seconds frequency, and we exclude 
all trades at the central bank limit because the impact is in these cases necessarily zero. 
Results presented in Table 4 show that the relation between order flow and returns is 
highly positive and of the same order as in other studies.
18 The interaction term of order 
flow with the central bank dummy is significantly negative. This indicates – as predicted 
by the target zone model – that price impact is dampened due to the intervention band. A 
                                                 
1 t
16  The order flow indicator equals one if a trade is buyer initiated and minus one otherwise. All 
order flow indicators in a 30 second interval are aggregated to yield the aggregate order flow 
indicator for the respective interval which is used here. 
17  One may think of this specification as a varying parameter model where 
10 1
t12 13 1 1





t t tt tt
m βλ OF
λββ CBday β CBday Dist
m β β OF β OF CBday β OF CBday Dist
++
++ +







18  Evans and Lyons (2002a) find that the order flow coefficient is 0.6 basis points per $10 million 
for DEM/USD and goes up for smaller markets, such as 2.4 for the Australian dollar, while Scalia 
(2006) finds an even higher value of 7.6 for the Czech koruna. The order flow coefficients in 
Table 4 are for order flow indicators and have to be multiplied by a factor of 20 to obtain the 
impact per $10 million. Table 4 suggests that the impact on non-intervention days is about 0.123, 
so that we have an average impact of 0.123×20 ≈ 2.5 basis points. 
  14Wald test of the restriction β1+β2=0, which would indicate that the price impact 
completely vanishes on intervention days, cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of 
significance. Furthermore, the interaction term with the distance variable Dist tends to be 
positive and is marginally significant. The estimated coefficient in specification (v) of 
Table 4 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the distance variable increases 
the price impact of order flow by slightly less than 20%. Therefore, trades occurring 
farther away from the Central Bank’s target zone have a tentatively higher price impact 
which is in line with the “honeymoon effect” of a target zone. 
  Due to the high frequency data available we can exercise a robustness test which 
is able to discriminate between mechanistic transitory liquidity effects of order flow and 
its permanent information transmission. Therefore, we estimate price impacts according 
to the Hasbrouck (1991) metric, i.e. as the cumulative response of midquote returns to 
order flow shocks in a SVAR-model. More specifically, we estimate a SVAR with 
midquote returns and market order flow as endogenous variables: 
  11 () [ ] tt t t Ay 1 2 Γ Ly B υ withVar υ I ++ =+ = +  (4) 
where y = [Δmt+1  OFt+1 ]
T, 











⎟  (5) 
so that the SVAR is just-identified and causality runs from order flow to midquote returns 
via α1. Γ(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator and the number of lags is chosen 
by the AIC for each subset of observations employed in the estimation detailed below. 
Permanent price impacts are computed by calculating the long-run cumulative response 
of midquote returns to order flow shocks (see e.g. Evans and Lyons, 2002a, or Payne, 
2003 for applications of this procedure to FX spot rates). 
  15The first row in Table 5 shows permanent price impacts of order flow on returns 
for intervention days (left column) and non-intervention days (right column). As can be 
seen, and corroborating the evidence from the Evans-Lyons-type regressions in Table 4, 
order flow has a much larger price impact on non-intervention days than on intervention 
days, consistent with the analysis of Krugman (1991). 
  In order to further examine whether the degree of price impact robustly depends 
on the fact of interventions or not, we compare the average price impact on intervention 
days with non-intervention days under various market conditions. Thus we condition the 
price impact analyses on variables that reflect market conditions typically found to be 
important in microstructure analysis. We use transacted volume as a proxy for market 
activity, midquote return volatility as a rough measure of information arrival and spreads 
to reflect the degree of asymmetric information in the market.
19 We then split the sample 
into two subsamples according to whether a sorting variable is below or above the sample 
median and the permanent price impact of order flow is calculated for intervention days 
and non-intervention days. Results of this procedure are given in the remaining rows of 
Table 5. 
  Results show marked variation in price impacts under different market conditions. 
Price impacts tend to be higher in times of more market activity, higher volatility and 
higher spreads, so that times of higher market activity seem to indicate more information 
processing. Most interesting for our analysis is, however, that price impacts differ in an 
economically significant way between intervention and non-intervention days. Price 
                                                 
19  These variables are also detrended to eliminate typical intraday patterns and thus to rule out the 
indirect influence of time. Therefore, we project each of the sorting variables on 60 time dummies 
representing the minute of the trading session. We then use the predicted values of this regression 
as the intraday pattern and divide the actual observations by the predicted value of the 
corresponding interval. 
  16impacts are much higher on non-intervention days in all regimes except the high 
volatility regime where the price impact increases only slightly. This again corroborates 
our finding that interventions dampen the impact of information arrival on spot rate 
movements as predicted by Krugman (1991). 
 
III.C.  Order Choice of (Un)Informed Traders during Intervention Days 
We know from the earlier descriptive parts of this paper that there seem to be 
participants trading “against” the intervention band as can be seen from the loss of 
reserves in Figure 3. At first sight this may be unexpected, given the credibility of the 
intervention band. A plausible interpretation of this fact may be, however, that a later 
depreciation of the rouble is expected due to some pressure from fundamentals and that 
either banks or informed customers of these banks trade on their anticipation.
20 There is 
indeed Reuters headline news supporting this view. 
On March 4 for example, there is Reuters news in which a market participant 
reports that “there are roubles available on the market. […] and banks used the 
opportunity to take long dollar positions expecting the rouble to go further down”. On 
another case, on March 6 a market participant is quoted with the following statement: “it 
is the usual story of past few sessions: banks build up speculative positions (against the 
rouble) early, then the central bank comes out to the unified session offering dollars at 
30.9950 and the market obeys, […]”. 
To explore who might be trading against the central bank, we exploit another 
feature of our data, i.e. its disaggregation of trading banks into more or less informed 
                                                 
20  In the latter case, that is pressure from customer trading, banks have to cover their open 
positions. 
  17participants, as discussed in Section II.A. Regarding the analytical framework we rely on 
the recent empirical order choice literature, such as Hasbrouck and Saar (2007) or 
Ranaldo (2004). This implies to model trading decisions by a set of possible influences, 
i.e. momentum, herding, ask volume, bid volume and time, in order to capture time-
varying dynamics of market conditions. Specifically, we include the following 
determinants of order choice: 
Momentum, which is measured as the midquote change over the past 30 seconds 
preceding an order. As in earlier studies we direction-adjust order flow by multiplying it by 
minus one if the current order is a sell order. This price momentum is intended to capture 
price pressure which induces adjustments in the order strategy of traders. 
Herding, which is measured as cumulative order flow over the past 30 seconds. 
Similar to the above price momentum, this variable is direction adjusted. We include it to 
capture the general trading direction. Since traders seem to learn from observed order 
flow (Lyons, 2001), changing order flow trends might induce different order placement 
strategies. 
Ask volume is the size of the best order on the ask side of the book and thus 
visible on the trading screen. Similarly, bid volume is the size of the best order on the bid 
side of the book and also visible on the trading screen. 
Same side volume is measured as the volume at the bid just prior to a buy order’s 
submission and as the volume at the ask just prior to a sell order’s submission, respectively. 
  Other side volume  is measured as the volume at the ask just prior to a buy order’s 
submission and as the volume at the bid just prior to a sell order’s submission, 
respectively. This and the preceding variable are suggested by Parlour’s (1998) model of 
  18limit order placement. The two volume variables are found to be important empirically 
e.g. in Griffiths et al. (2000) or Ranaldo (2004). 
Time indicates the minute of the trading session (1, …, 60) and is used to capture 
deterministic time patterns. 
Distance from central bank’s ask is the difference between the actual ask price of 
the central bank and the last transaction price (in pips). This variable is used to test 
whether the likelihood of trading against the central bank (the likelihood is high when the 
distance is low) influences the behavior of traders. 
We complement the standard variables, from momentum to time, by another 
variable, given at the end of above definitions, i.e. the distance of the central bank’s price 
from the current market price. If the heavy buying at the central bank’s ask is noise 
trading, then the share of buy orders should be largely independent of the distance from 
the intervention price. Moreover, there should be no difference between more and less 
informed traders. 
We estimate a logit model, where the dependent variable is coded 1 if the market 
order is a buy and 0 for a sell. The model is estimated separately for banks from Moscow 
and St. Petersburg to see if there is a difference in the trading behavior of the banks that 
are expected to be better informed. Estimation results are presented in Table 6. 
  We see that trading behavior of both groups is different. Traders from the center, 
i.e. Moscow and St. Petersburg, buy more when the price comes closer to the upper 
intervention level, whereas traders from the periphery behave in a contrary manner. 
Among the control variables, herding is the only one which has the same significant sign 
for both groups. The further variables are different as center traders buy with momentum 
  19and later in the session. Periphery traders, however, buy more when the ask volume is 
larger, bid volume smaller and earlier in the session. Overall, the significantly different 
behavior of better informed center and less informed periphery traders suggests that 
traders’ buys at the ask may be no accident but a sort of speculative mini-attack on the 
target zone. 
  As another approach to address this issue, we examine the order choice between 
marketable limit orders that receive immediate execution and all other limit orders. 
Again, if not due to heterogeneity in trading motives, there should be no difference 
between the likelihood of using one of both order types, with respect to price distance 
from the central bank’s ask. In order to investigate whether order aggressiveness changes 
systematically with the distance to the central bank's quote, we run a logit regression 
where the dependent variable is coded 1 when a trader uses a market order and 0 when 
she uses a limit order. Explanatory variables parallel those of the approach above and 
results are presented in Table 7. 
  Again, the variable of interest – distance to the central bank's quote – is 
significant for both groups but with an opposite sign. Center traders are more likely to 
submit orders for immediate execution when the price is closer to the upper intervention 
band, i.e. they trade more aggressively when the price comes close to the central bank’s 
limit. By contrast, periphery traders are more likely to employ non-marketable limit 
orders and thus trade less aggressively near the central bank’s target zone limit. Turning 
to the control variables, herding is again significant for both groups. Momentum has the 
same impact as herding for periphery traders. Both groups tend to prefer immediate 
execution when volatility is smaller and the spread larger. It is mainly the book volume 
  20determinants that differ between both groups: whereas periphery traders show the 
expected behavior, i.e. to buy fast when there is much volume on the same side and vice 
versa, the pattern of center traders seems to be dominated by their behavior towards the 
large intervention order. As they heavily buy against this order, their order choice 
behavior superficially looks perverse. 
 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CENTRAL BANK 
 
  The posting of limit orders is an effective device for containing exchange rate 
movements within narrow bounds. However, credibility of such a mechanism depends 
upon the central bank posting a quantity that is large relative to the market so that 
whenever the central bank’s quote rises to the top of the order book, the market cannot 
exhaust the quantity on offer and move the exchange rate outside of the central bank’s 
desired range. In this analysis of the Russian central bank’s activity on an electronic 
crossing network, it is clearly the case that the limit orders are very large relative to the 
quantities traded on this market. This conveys the image of a credible target zone.  
  The literature on intervention has often focused on the channel through which 
intervention changes exchange rates. The typical discretionary central bank intervention 
is accompanied by sterilization of reserve flows in order to leave the money supply 
unchanged. Since interest rates and prices are left unchanged, the usual avenues through 
which exchange rates are changed include the portfolio balance and signaling channels, 
or coordination of expectations (e.g. Reitz and Taylor, 2008). In the special case where 
intervention occurs through limit orders on an electronic crossing network, it may be less 
  21likely that relative bond supplies are changed so that the portfolio balance channel is not 
a likely candidate. There is clear signaling of the central bank’s desired exchange rate 
with the posting of a limit order that the market learns must come from the central bank. 
In addition, such a posted limit order, with a very large quantity associated, serves as a 
credible mechanism for coordinating the expectations of market participants. 
  When a central bank supports the domestic currency by providing a perfectly 
elastic supply of dollars at a given exchange rate, reserve losses will be associated with 
trades that occur. In the case under study, where we know the trade sizes, it is possible to 
calculate the reserve losses associated with the intervention activity. Figure 4 reproduces 
the Figure 3 central bank limit orders and actual market prices in the upper figure while 
the lower figure illustrates the cumulative loss of reserves. The changing slope of the line 
in the bottom part of Figure 4 reflects trade sizes at the central bank’s ask price. Over the 
week as a whole, the central bank sold approximately $338 million dollars for roubles 
during the electronic trading sessions. The data indicate that on March 7 there were some 
large trades late in the session as the loss of reserves increases steeply on this day. It is 
notable that on the next day, the central bank allowed the official exchange rate to 
depreciate to 31.1 as seen in Figure 2. 
  The reserve losses occurring on March 7 may represent a sort of “mini speculative 
attack”. The fact that there was no limit order placed at 30.9950 on March 8, so that the 
exchange rate was allowed to depreciate, is consistent with the central bank defending its 
reserves by allowing the depreciation. Perhaps one disadvantage of maintaining a target 
zone with a visible limit order on an electronic crossing network is the ability of private 
bank participants to infer the reserve loss in real time from reported completion of trades. 
  22If the market knows that there is a very large limit order that serves to bound exchange 
rate movements, then it is reasonable to expect that this is posted by the central bank. As 
trades occur at this price, the quantities shown on the screen for the last transaction allow 
traders to calculate a cumulative reserve loss. If reserve losses are estimated to be 
reaching a threshold that would lead to the central bank’s removal of the limit order, one 
would expect traders to be even more aggressive in trading at the central bank’s price. 
  However, a potential central bank advantage of intervening in the passive form of 
posting limit orders is that the identity of counterparties is revealed after each trade is 
completed. This information may be useful in enforcing good behavior on the part of the 
private banks as they know the central bank can monitor their trades when the central 
bank is the counterparty. If the central bank exerts moral suasion or other enforcement 
mechanisms, then private banks may regulate their trades at the central bank price to 
avoid any appearance of an attack on the central bank. This mechanism may be 
weakened, however, if private banks just intermediate trades for their informed customers 
who are not necessarily revealed to the central bank. 
 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have focused on a short period of 2002 when the Russian Central Bank 
maintained a target zone for the rouble price of a dollar by posting limit orders on an 
electronic crossing network. The central bank orders were very large relative to the 
market and served as a credible signaling device to private market participants. It was 
unlikely that the market would exhaust the central bank’s posted order quantity given the 
relatively small size of trades compared to the size of the limit order. Effectively, there 
  23was a perfectly elastic supply of dollars being provided at an exchange rate of 30.9950 
that was visible to private banks whenever the central bank’s price was at the top of the 
order book. 
Due to available deep information about the order book, we are able to analyze 
implications of the target zone literature in a way not being tackled in the earlier 
literature.
21 We find for our sample that trades at the central bank’s limit price 
simultaneously induce a downward shift in volatility on a daily frequency, i.e. they 
reduce the overall level of volatility. However, at the intraday frequency, such trades 
induce a higher transitory volatility that lasts for a few minutes. The same results hold for 
spreads, although the transitory effects on bid-ask spreads are weaker than for return 
volatility. The dampening effect of trades associated with defense of the target zone can 
also be recognized from the lower price impact of order flow on days when the central 
bank is an active participant in the market. There is evidence of a “honeymoon effect” 
where the price impact falls the closer price is to the central bank’s limit. Taken together, 
these results fit into the picture painted by the target zone literature. It follows from this 
literature that central bank policy must be credible which is supported here by the very 
large limit orders. It would be interesting to know whether our finding holds in different 
samples. 
Finally, we see from the intraday order choice analysis that more informed traders 
expect – in line with fundamentals and correctly in retrospect – a further decline of the 
rouble since they trade aggressively against the upper limit of the target zone. This is in 
contrast to the behavior of the uninformed and is consistent with rational speculation 
                                                 
21  Findings are not driven by particular characteristics of the Russian market as the daily 
interbank trading session at the MICEX has characteristics like those of other electronic crossing 
networks. 
  24from informed traders in combination with an intervention policy to successfully calm the 
market. 
  Since market participants know the size of trades that occurred, the central bank’s 
reserve losses from trades at its offer price, i.e. $338 million over the week under study, 
are easily calculated. This transparency of the central bank’s position is one potential 
disadvantage of using such a mechanism to target exchange rates. However, there may be 
an informational counterweight in that the central bank also learned who was trading at 
their limit price as after each trade is completed, the parties learn each other’s identity. So 
the central bank could potentially use moral suasion or other means to discipline any 
private banks that might be viewed as abusing the system or contributing to a speculative 
attack. 
  The provision of liquidity via an electronic limit order book is only likely to serve 
as an effective exchange rate targeting device in a market where over-the-counter trading 
is small compared to the electronic market and liquidity is concentrated on one trading 
platform. In the case of Russia, non-residents traded in an offshore market due to a lack 
of full convertibility of the rouble so that the domestic market was segmented from 
outside pressures and this allowed the central bank to effectively facilitate a target zone 
using limit orders. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics per day        
 
Day of 









1 5.01  3,548  30.9600 30.9400 299 109  95,336,000 1,470 64,854
4 4.95  3,405  30.9950 30.9420 922 0  165,000,000 1,653 99,819
5 1.27  4,049  30.9950 30.9855 13 0  83,964,000 1,593 52,708
6 0.61  3,392  30.9950 30.9920 748 0  165,000,000 1,639 100,671
7 1.31  3,334  30.9950 30.9851 602 0  212,000,000 1,555 136,334
11 5.58  3,372  31.0720 30.9950     69,543,000 1,258 55,281
12 1.57  4,281  31.0632 31.0504     94,964,000 1,640 57,905
13 2.19  4,235  31.0840 31.0600     74,905,000 1,621 46,209
14 7.52  4,715  31.0720 31.0050     65,768,000 1,649 39,884
15 4.92  4,523  31.0900 31.0250     82,350,000 1,571 52,419
18 7.25  4,499  31.1200 31.0701     65,267,000 1,575 41,439
19 3.64  4,324  31.1400 31.1175     69,565,000 1,582 43,973
20 2.89  4,446  31.1449 31.1285     94,152,000 1,686 55,843
21 4.23  4,047  31.1499 31.1151     80,408,000 1,527 52,657
22 4.21  4,485  31.1400 31.0999     77,721,000 1,674 46,428
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for intervention versus non-intervention days    
Days 
of March  stdev  obs  max price  min price 
trades at 





1 to  7  3.24  17,728  30.9950 30.9400 2584 109  720,000,000 7910 91,024
11 to 21  4.89  38,442  31.1499 30.9950   697,000,000 14109 49,401
Panel C: Volatility tests    
H0: σintervention days = σnon-intervention days (all events)  **(0.00)  
  **(0.00) non-intervention days (all events off the quote)   = σ : σintervention days H032
 
Notes: Panel A shows descriptive statistics for each day of our sample. March 1
st to 7
th are days with major central bank intervention, 
March 22
nd only has a few very minor interventions from the central bank. Columns “stdev” and “obs” show the sample standard 
deviation of midquote returns and the number of observations on a given day. The next two columns show the maximum and 
minimum price. Trades at CB ask (bid) shows the number of trades at the ask (bid) quote of the central bank. All volumes are 
expressed in USD. Panel B shows the same descriptive statistics for all days in the respective two main blocks of our sample: March 
1  to March 21
st  (major intervention days) versus March 11
th st to 7
th  (non-intervention days). Panel C shows p-values for the test that 
the standard deviation of midquote returns is the same on intervention days and non-interventions days. The test is based on Newey-
West HAC robust standard errors. Stars refer to the level of significance, *: 5%-level, **: 1%-level.
 Table 2. Order and trade activity of the central bank and private banks 
 
  Central Bank  Private Banks 
Limit orders submitted  11 6,626 
Number of trades initiated  7 7,910 
Median limit order size  $50,298,000 $30,000 
Maximum limit order size  $151,000,000 $45,000,000 
Minimum limit order size  $6,000,000 $1,000 
Median trade size  $210,000 $20,000 
Maximum trade size  $45,000,000 $7,995,000 
Minimum trade size  $100,000 $1,000 
 
Notes: The data summarize all trade and order activity of the Russian central bank and private banks 
active on the interbank SELT system over the period March 1 to March 22, 2002. 
 
 
  33Table 3. FX spot rate volatility and mean spreads 
 
  Dependent: Volatility  Dependent: Mean spread 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
0.11  0.12 0.08 2.40 2.68  1.62 Share CB-1 **[2.92]  **[2.82] *[2.52] **[3.07] **[3.00  *[2.23
0.10  0.11 0.07 1.35 1.46  0.20 Share CB-2 **[3.81]  **[3.70] *[2.53] **[2.65] **[2.48  [0.40]
0.10  0.10 0.06 1.12 1.08  0.31 Share CB-3 **[2.63]  *[2.49] [1.61] [1.46] [1.25]  [0.52
0.02  0.01 -0.03 Share CB   -4 [0.68]  [0.58] [-0.33]
-0.49  -0.48 -0.27 -9.13 -9.54  -2.32 CB-day  **[-13.85]  **[-12.36] **[-6.87] **[-11.40 **[-8.32]  **[-3.55]
0.14 -0.09 volatility     -1 **[4.34] [-0.13
0.08 -0.51 volatility     -2 [1.81] [-0.82
0.01 0.78 mean spread     -1 **[3.43] **[10.42]
-0.00 0.06 mean spread     -2 [-0.83] [1.31]
0.04 0.62 volume     -1 *[2.07] *[2.05]
-0.02 -0.52 volume     -2 [-1.59] [-1.52]
time   -0.02 -0.00 -0.61  -0.04
**[-3.72] [-1.14] **[-4.17]  [-0.97]
0.03 0.00 1.03  1.70
time
2×10
-2   **[4.00] [1.47] **[3.92]  *[2.20]
0.60  0.63 0.26 13.92 15.10  2.96 constant  **[21.53]  **[10.02] **[5.42] **[13.20] **[7.99]  [1.20]
adj. R
2 0.09 0.12 0.24 0.06 0.15  0.62
AIC 1.35  1.33 1.10 7.66 7.55  6.32
obs 1,740  1,740 1,740 1,755 1,755  1,755
Notes: This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the midquote return 
standard deviation in specifications (i) to (iii) and the mean bid-ask spread in specifications (iv) 
to (vi). The sampling frequency is 30 seconds. T-statistics based on Newey-West HAC standard 
errors in parentheses. Stars refer to the level of significance, *: 5%-level, **: 1%-level. 
  34Table 4. Price impact of order flow 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) 
0.087 0.123 0.087 0.123  0.121 OFt **[6.99] **[9.14] **[7.49] **[9.12]  **[8.67]
-0.083 -0.096  -0.100
OF×(CB-day)  t **[-3.85] **[-3.79]  **[-4.33]
-1.685 10.327  11.15
OF×(CB-day)×Dist  t [-0.31] *[1.98]  *[2.04]
0.089   Δm-1 [1.57]
-0.026   Δm-2 [-1.08]
0.011 OF   t-1 [1.38]
0.003 OF   t-2 [0.31]
-0.480 -0.433 -0.482 -0.414  -0.436 const.  **[-7.39] **[-7.21] **[-7.49] **[-7.04]  **[-6.87]
adj. R
2 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.15
obs 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800  1,770
Notes: The table shows regression results of midquote returns on order flow and further controls. 
The sampling frequency is 30 seconds. T-statistics based on Newey-West HAC standard errors 









  35Table 5. Permanent price impacts under different market conditions 
 
Price Impacts (×1,000) 
  CB-days Non-CB-days 
0.721  1.444  All trades  [0.000; 1.442]  [0. 664; 2.224]   
0.547  1.057  Low volume  [-0.101; 1.194]  [0.303; 1.811] 
0.836  2.053  High volume  [-0.042; 1.741]  [0.716; 3.390] 
0.140  0.651  Low volatility  [-0.198; 0.478]  [0.257; 1.045] 
1.742  1.899  High volatility  [0.021; 3.464]  [0.613; 3.185] 
0.242  0.954  Low spreads  [-0.194; 0.678]  [0.318; 1.590] 
1.211  2.101  High spreads  [-0.248; 2.670]  [0.453; 3.749] 
 
 
Notes: The table shows permanent price impacts from order flow on midquote returns. 
Permanent price impacts are measured according to the SVAR in equations (4) and (5). The 
sampling frequency is 30 seconds. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals are shown in squared 
brackets.
  36Table 6. Trading direction of different market participants 
 
 
Traders from Moscow 
and St. Petersburg      Traders from Periphery   
0.39 0.38    constant    **(0.00) ** (0.00) 
  0.47 0.26  Momentum    ** (0.00) (0.17) 
  2.69 1.46  Herding    ** (0.00) ** (0.00) 
 
0.03 0.01  Ask volume    (0.41) *0.03)   
0.01 -0.01  Bid volume    (0.65) **(0.00)   
7.87 -3.90  Time      ** (0.00) (0.06) 
-7.59 3.82  Distance (from CB’s ask)      ** (0.00) *(0.04) 
McFadden R
2 0.07  0.03     
AIC 1.18   1.34   
SIC 1.19   1.37     
Log likelihood  -2385.79   -863.64   
Restr. log likelihood  -2573.00   -891.37     
LR statistic (6 df)  374.41   55.46   
Probability(LR stat)  **(0.00)   **(0.00)     
Notes: The table shows results from logit regression models where the dependent variable is 
coded as one when an order is a buy order and zero when it is a sell order. The sampling 
frequency is event time. Bootstrap p-values based on 250 replications in parentheses. Stars refer 
to the level of significance, *: 5%-level, **: 1%-level. 
  37Table 7. Order aggressiveness of different market participants 
 
Traders from Moscow 
and St. Petersburg    Traders from Periphery 
0.15 -0.37  constant  **(0.00) **(0.00) 
0.06 0.41  Momentum  (0.63) *(0.03) 
1.24 1.31  Herding   **(0.00) **(0.00) 
-4.39 4.39  Distance (from CB's ask)  **(0.00) **(0.00) 
-0.08 0.01  Same side volume  **(0.00) *(0.02) 
0.01 -0.01  Other side volume  **(0.00) **(0.00) 
1.32 1.46  Spread  *(0.05) (0.10) 
-1.85 -2.60  Volatility  (0.14) (0.09) 
17.54 12.36  Time  (0.00) **(0.00) 
McFadden R
2 0.03  0.02   
AIC 1.31   1.33   
SIC 1.32   1.35   
Log likelihood  -4847.39   -2055.68   
Restr. log likelihood  -5003.88   -2107.49   
LR statistic (6 df)  312.97   103.62   
Probability(LR stat)  **(0.00)   **(0.00)   
 
Notes: The table shows results from logit regression models where the dependent variable is 
coded as one when an order is a market order and zero if the order is a limit order. The sampling 
frequency is event time. Bootstrap p-values based on 250 replications in parentheses. Stars refer 
to the level of significance, *: 5%-level, **: 1%-level. 
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Figure 1: Number of trades and order events per 5-minute interval of the trading session 
The figure shows the number of trades and order events (submissions and cancellations) 
occurring on the SELT system used for interbank USDRUR spot trading in Russia for each 5-
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5 1 01 52 02 53 03 54 04 55 05 56 0Figure 2: Exchange Rate, Roubles per dollar 
The official rouble price of the dollar is plotted for the first half of 2002. The period of central bank intervention studied in this paper 




































  40Figure 3: Central Bank Limit Orders and Trading Activity 
The upper figure illustrates the central bank’s order at a price of 30.9450 for March 1 and 30.9950 for March 4-7, along with the 
actual price of executed deals in the market. Note that the central bank’s bid price is held fixed at 30.9400, on March 1 there were 
several trades at this bid.  The lower figure illustrates the quantity on offer at the central bank’s limit price for March 4-7. 
 















Day of March 2002 
Central Bank's limit order volume at the ask price 30.9950 (in mill. USD) 
RUR/USD 
  41Figure 4: Central Bank Limit Orders, Market Price, and Cumulative Reserve Loss 
The upper figure illustrates the central bank’s limit order at an ask price of 30.9450 for March 1 and 30.9950 for March 4-7, along 
with the actual price of executed deals in the market. The lower figure shows the cumulative loss of dollar reserves as a result of 
central bank trades. 
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